Yesterday’s Financial Times says that US wheat inventories fell to a sixty year low and may even force the US to import wheat this year. Apparently it had sold too much wheat last year and now will have to replenish stocks. That news drove prices for certain varieties of wheat up nearly 11% last week and 50% so far this year.There are also estimates that India, the world’s second largest wheat consumer, may have to import significantly more wheat than in the past, beginning in April this year.
One way of bringing wheat prices back down, according to analysts, is if higher prices in India and China cause farmers to allocate land away from cotton production to wheat production. Price controls in China may make that process very difficult.I am no grain expert, but the recent trend of shortages and rising grain prices is becoming monotonous and bodes poorly for China’s fight against inflation in 2008.With food prices rising so quickly, even an annual RMB appreciation of 9-10% will not bring the price of foreign food imports down in local currency terms.
Next week we will get January’s CPI and PPI inflation numbers. I doubt they will be good, but I suspect that inflation doves will insist that the distortions caused by the winter weather crisis make them useless in determining policy changes. Next month’s CPI numbers are also likely to be distorted, by the spring festival.That means it won’t be until mid-April, when we get the March numbers, that we might have sufficient evidence of persisting inflation to affect policy choices.Of course that is the time the new provincial and municipal leadership comes into power, and so there may not be a lot of appetite for economic tightening anyway.
Separately Peter Mandelson, the EU’s trade commissioner, made some fairly aggressive claims last week in a speech at Cambridge University about rising European protectionist ire aimed at China.Mandelson has the reputation of being a hard-core free trader, but his comments suggest that he is finding it increasingly difficult politically to explain away Chinese trade policies to his European constituents.The whole shifting of Chinese trade surpluses from the US to Europe never had much chance, in my opinion, of being sustainable. Thanks to its more flexible economy and financial markets, and perhaps a different attitude towards globalization, the US is able to accept and absorb these kinds off imbalances much more easily than Europe.This means, I think, that unless the dollar rises strongly against the euro, it will be difficult for China to slow the rate of appreciation of the RMB without causing rising anger in Europe and maybe even trade-related moves.China might want to do so should it suddenly become worried about a rapid drop in exports to the US caused by a slowing US economy.
Rising global inflation, the potential US slowdown, its impact on the rest of the world, and the accompanying credit crunch are seriously complicating China’s policy options. A few years ago when former Brazilian central bank governor Arminio Fraga visited Beijing, one of the points he tried to make to government officials with whom he met, he told me, was that the best time to make difficult adjustments to the currency regime was when local and external conditions were great, as they were at the time, otherwise the financial authorities might find themselves in the position of being forced to make adjustments when conditions were much more difficult.It seems like an obvious point, but bears repeating often.
Michael Pettis is a professor at Peking University's Guanghua School of Management, where he specializes in Chinese financial markets. He has also taught, from 2002 to 2004, at Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management and, from 1992 to 2001, at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Business. He is a member of the board of directors of ABC-CA Fund Management Co., a Sino-French joint venture based in Shanghai.
Pettis has worked on Wall Street in trading, capital markets, and corporate finance since 1987, when he joined the Sovereign Debt trading team at Manufacturers Hanover (now JP Morgan). Most recently, from 1996 to 2001, Pettis worked at Bear Stearns, where he was Managing Director-Principal heading the Latin American Capital Markets and the Liability Management groups. He has also worked as a partner in a merchant banking boutique that specialized in securitizing Latin American assets and at Credit Suisse First Boston, where he headed the emerging markets trading team. Besides trading and capital markets, Pettis has been involved in sovereign advisory work, including for the Mexican government on the privatization of its banking system, the Republic of Macedonia on the restructuring of its international bank debt, and the South Korean Ministry of Finance on the restructuring of the country’s commercial bank debt.
Pettis is a member of the Institute of Latin American Studies Advisory Board at Columbia University as well as the Dean’s Advisory Board at the School of Public and International Affairs. He is the author of several books, including The Volatility Machine: Emerging Economies and the Threat of Financial Collapse (Oxford University Press, 2001). He received an MBA in Finance in 1984 and an MIA in Development Economics in 1981, both from Columbia University.