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November 16, 2007


FRI
16
NOV
2007

US slowdown and Chinese investment

By Michael Pettis

Two related stories in today’s Financial Times point out one of the most worrying economic risks facing the world today.  The first is a report by China’s National Bureau of Statistics that fixed asset investment (FAI) in urban areas was up 26.9% (to RMB 8.9 trillion) during the first 10 months of the year compared with the same period last year.  This is the highest it has been in over a year.  Market expectations were for an already high 26.3%, in line with last month’s figure of 26.4%.

 

In an entry yesterday I pointed out that the slowing down of the growth of industrial production was one of the few good numbers that had come out in recent months because rising industrial production is what powers growth in the trade surplus, and China desperately needed to bring the trade surplus down.  Although most economists were expecting continued moderation in the industrial production growth rate, I was (surprise!) less optimistic because September’s number had been so high and October’s trade surplus was at a record level, so it seemed to me that the dynamics driving this money-creating machine were stronger than ever.

 

The very high FAI numbers deepens my concern.  All of this investment is likely to increase production, and if Chinese consumption does not keep pace (and it seems that it cannot), the excess must increase the country’s trade surplus and so its money growth.

 

The second article in the Financial Times has the headline “US slowdown threatens Chinese export growth”.  It reports that China’s commerce ministry has warned that a slowdown in the US economy could create a sharp enough drop in China’s exports to create what they called a “turning point” for economic growth.  According to the article the PBoC estimates that every 1% drop in US GDP growth would be accompanied by a 6% drop in Chinese export growth – scary indeed, given that exports account for one-third of Chinese growth, and are probably the healthiest part of that growth.

 

Of course this might just be the typical Chinese posturing before a series of important meetings (with Secretary Paulson, President Sarkozy and ECB Governor Trichet) later this month in which the currency is sure to come up, but perhaps it is also true.  I think I am less pessimistic than most about a sharp slowdown in the US economy, but I confess to being well out of my depths and I recognize that my expectations come with a very wide standard deviation. 

 

The question is what happens if we have both furious Chinese investment and a stalling US economy.  High levels of Chinese investment will lead to high levels of industrial production.  My simple calculus says that since this will result in a growing excess of production over consumption, and since the difference must be equal (give or take a few smaller accounts) to the trade surplus, the result must be a rising Chinese trade surplus.

 

But if US GDP (and that of the rest of the world in the aggregate) slows, and global consumption slows with it, how does this work?  One effect might be that Chinese exports simply displace the exports of other low-income (or even some middle- and high-income) countries – China, in effect, exports unemployment to its neighbors.  This would be accomplished by lowering prices, and thus lowering corporate profitability (which might affect the banking system).

 

Another possibility is that China counteracts a global slowdown by increasing domestic investment further (I don’t think it is likely to increase consumption).  I guess there are three ways this can happen.  First, corporations can invest more in productive facilities.  Second, the government can invest more in infrastructure, education, health, etc.  And third, corporations can be forced to invest by increasing inventory.

 

I think we would all agree that the third possibility would be a disaster.  Rising inventories would simply signal that we are in the early stages of an old-fashioned over-production crisis, like those the US used regularly to experience in the 19th Century.  Unless the global economy quickly turned around and started absorbing those inventories, the process would have to be followed by a sharp drop in investment and employment.  (In that context there is a monograph, written by Richard Chew of Virginia State University, called “Certain Victims of an International Contagion: the Panic of 1797 and the Hard Times of the Late 1790s in Baltimore”, that may give some interesting insights on China’s transition from export-led growth to domestic demand-led growth.)

 

The first possibility is better, but not a lot more.  If corporations invest even more in production facilities, we would effectively be simply doubling the bet, and hoping that global growth emerged quickly enough to absorb the future increase in inventories.  Doubling a bet is only fun if you win the bet the second time around – if not, the outcome is even worse.

 

The second possibility, that the government expands investment in infrastructure, is probably the least damaging, but it would involve a significant re-orientation of the economy (good in the long run) and a significant increase in debt.  This last may not seem like a big deal, but I think real government debt levels are much higher in China than people think (at least 60% of GDP if contingent liabilities through the banking system are included), and I would not be totally happy about seeing it rise too quickly.  Still, it is probably the least damaging outcome, at least in the short run.

 

So, my prediction?  If the US slows down, expect to see a run-up in Chinese government debt or a rapid ruin-up in Chinese corporate inventory, or both. 

 

2:10 AM | Permalink | 1 comment


Comments (1) for "US slowdown and Chinese inve...
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The second possibility is much better, given people are deeply unsatisfied with the current education and healthcare systems. If there is an economic slowdown, 2nd choice can ease both economic and social tensions in China.
By fatbrick - 11/15/2007 11:04 PM
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Biography

 

Michael Pettis is a professor at Peking University's Guanghua School of Management, where he specializes in Chinese financial markets.  He has also taught, from 2002 to 2004, at Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management and, from 1992 to 2001, at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Business.   He is a member of the board of directors of ABC-CA Fund Management Co., a Sino-French joint venture based in Shanghai.

 

Pettis has worked on Wall Street in trading, capital markets, and corporate finance since 1987, when he joined the Sovereign Debt trading team at Manufacturers Hanover (now JP Morgan). Most recently, from 1996 to 2001, Pettis worked at Bear Stearns, where he was Managing Director-Principal heading the Latin American Capital Markets and the Liability Management groups. He has also worked as a partner in a merchant banking boutique that specialized in securitizing Latin American assets and at Credit Suisse First Boston, where he headed the emerging markets trading team. Besides trading and capital markets, Pettis has been involved in sovereign advisory work, including for the Mexican government on the privatization of its banking system, the Republic of Macedonia on the restructuring of its international bank debt, and the South Korean Ministry of Finance on the restructuring of the country’s commercial bank debt.

 

Pettis is a member of the Institute of Latin American Studies Advisory Board at Columbia University as well as the Dean’s Advisory Board at the School of Public and International Affairs.  He is the author of several books, including The Volatility Machine: Emerging Economies and the Threat of Financial Collapse (Oxford University Press, 2001).  He received an MBA in Finance in 1984 and an MIA in Development Economics in 1981, both from Columbia University.

 

He can be contacted at michael@pettis.comOpen in a new window.