The devastating earthquake is also bad for monetary policy
By Michael Pettis
This has been a sad week for China, and it has certainly not been easy to watch on television the heartbreaking scenes of the effect of Monday’s earthquake.Sichuan is a heavily populated province, and many of my students have friends and family in the affected areas, so the disaster has hit us very hard.The fact that so many of the victims were schoolchildren makes it all the more horrifying. Bless China, as my student Gao Ming wrote me earlier today, a phrase many worried and dismayed students around campus have been repeating.Next week my friends and I will organize a concert to raise money for the earthquake victims. It’s not much, but everyone feels helpless and wants to do something to help, however small.
Unfortunately the earthquake and its corresponding devastation are almost certainly going to complicate matters horribly for the PBoC in its attempt to manage monetary policy and fight inflation.Already before and immediately after the earthquake the new numbers coming out were worrying.For example yesterday the authorities announced that new RMB lending for April amounted to RMB 464 billion, up substantially from March’s RMB 283 billion (Merrill says this is equal to 43.0% of their second quarter quota, while CSFB says it is 51.5%). The total new lending year to date is RMB 1.79 trillion, which is not much less than half of the RMB 3.6 trillion increase in loans for all of 2007.This year we were supposed to see a cap on loan growth equal to last year’s total increase in lending, so we are already at nearly half the full year’s new loan quota.
Banks have typically front-loaded their quarterly lending quota into the first month of each quarter, and this quarter seemed at first to be no different in that respect from other quarters.Had it not been for the earthquake I would have predicted that banks would certainly exceed their loan quota for the first half of the year, but not by nearly as much as the year-to-date figures imply. With the devastation wreaked by the earthquake, however, and the mounting anger and need for reconstruction accompanying the devastation, I am not so confident of that prediction. I suspect that the financial authorities are more likely to lean towards leniency on loan growth than to insist on strict maintenance of the caps.
They will also most likely be pretty lenient about money growth, even though the most recent numbers suggest they have already been too lenient. Besides the jump in lending we’ve seen a rebound in M2, which grew 16.9% year or year in April – according to Bloomberg the market was expecting an already high 16.2% increase.M1 is also up, by 19.1%.Both of these measures increased relative to March year-on-year figures. The China Daily quotes Fan Fangzhi, an economist with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, as saying "The statistics indicated that the Chinese economy is still challenged by excess liquidity and a rebound in credit growth."I would find that hard to dispute.
Interestingly there has been a veritable battle in the press about which way to go.One article in ChinaDaily yesterday proclaimed “Chinese economy still under liquidity pressure” and argued for more tightening, while an article by Xin Zhiming today is headlined: “Fears grow yuan lending may stoke inflation.”Both of these articles warned about excessively loose monetary policies and the inflation threat.
On the other hand yesterday’s ChinaDaily also published an article titled “Price battle half-won,” which claims, rather optimistically I think, that the government’s “tightening” policy is working and must be maintained, although the author does acknowledge that it is “far too early to claim victory in our battle against rising inflation.” Yes, I think I agree.It is far, far, far too early to declare that particular victory. Meanwhile an article today by Ma Hongman proclaims “Maintaining growth the only option,” and he argues that while the causes of inflation in China are not under the control of policy-makers, “the three engines for economic growth - investment, consumption and trade - have all slowed down their forward pace”.
In short, the Chinese economy is seeing an overheating and a slowdown in different parts simultaneously, making it much more difficult to choose specific policy tools.Thus, it is advisable that the policymakers prepare themselves for the worst scenario in future when they fix economic policies.
The "worst scenario" mentioned above is stagflation, when inflation is combined with stagnation.The high inflation level is primarily caused by the elevated prices on the international market sneaking into China through its huge import volume. Since the domestic economic slowdown is also possible, it is hence not impossible for the country to witness a stagflation.
Although I too worry about the possibility of stagflation (and this is the first time I think I have seen the word used in the Chinese press about China) I think Ma is mistaken in seeing inflation as caused primarily by rising prices in the international market and so out of the control of local policy-makers. It seems to me that domestic monetary policy is clearly at the root of Chinese inflation, but his argument is an interesting new spin in the growth-versus-inflation debate – yes there is inflation, he acknowledges, but there is nothing we can do about it so let’s focus on growth.
The government is, however, very worried about the inflationary impact of the earthquake, and is taking steps to control the impact, but perhaps the wrong steps. According to Bloomberg:
China ordered authorities in earthquake-hit areas to step up price monitoring, to prevent “large-scale” increases and hoarding. Prices of food, fuel, medicine and drinking water will be closely monitored and local governments can take “intervention” measures, the National Development and Reform Commission said in a statement on its Web site late yesterday.
Clearly the earthquake in Sichuan will not only impact agricultural production and the ability to deliver products to the market, but its reconstruction will fuel a boom in demand for energy, materials, and a wide variety of related goods and services. Recognition of the impact of the earthquake both on loosening monetary policy and on increasing the demand for a variety of goods seems to have powered the stock market today. It closed up 2.73% today, driven by smelters and banks.
The government’s automatic response to this potential surge in demand is to clamp down even tighter on price increases, but this cannot possibly have any but the most adverse effect.After all it is one thing to freeze prices in order to drive out inflationary expectations, but the earthquake has caused a real increase in demand and a real decrease in supply – and the stock market immediately recognized that fact. How can price freezes possibly eliminate the disequilibrium?
In fact yesterday’s China Daily had a very long article on the difficulty of maintaining existing price freezes.The article is called “To raise oil prices or not, that is the question” and starts out very bluntly with: “Diesel sold out. This notice can be seen at many gas stations in the country.”It explores both the difficulty of keeping prices at current levels – shortages and an increasing fiscal subsidy – and the difficulty of letting prices rise – the inflationary impact.People like me of course will point out that price freezes simply convert inflation from one kind, the kind that’s measured in CPI, to another, the kind that shows up as shortages and higher taxes, but the idea that China does not have monetary inflation, simply a temporary food-supply problem, has become so ingrained in policy, even though fewer and fewer people believe it, that its impact will stay with us for a while.
Isn't any dramatic re-valuation in the RMB only possible after the August Olympics? The negative world press reaction to an appreciated RMB just before the Olympics would draw howls and condemnations of "speculators" and "profiteers" for the Beijing government; before August is a political impossibility, isn't it? And with a massive life-loss from the Sichuan eartquake, aren't anti-inflationary measures also now all but impossible until after the Olympics?
September will be the post-Olympics feel-good month of basking in the emergence of China from centuries of foreign domination. October, however, will be a time of putting the economic house in order. Buy the market short-term, sell the market long-term; or, just buy the RMB and hold.
Most people say that the government can't do anything before the Olympics, and that may well be true, but it is not always clear that the government can pick its timing. You can easily make the argument that the monetary loosening that comes as a consequence of the earthquake will, by making inflation and overheating problems worse very quickly, make it more obvious that the government must adjust the currency, and this perception would speed up capital inflows. I have argued since early last year that the amount of hot money inflows was the most important factor in determining whether or not the government would need to maxi-revalue. It is abundant hot money that makes a difficult monetary policy crazy.
By Michael Pettis - 5/14/2008 5:12 PM
Thanks, Jarod. I was going to put up a picture of you but couldn't find any that weren't embarrassing.
By Michael Pettis - 5/14/2008 5:12 PM
With 3 mllion homes to be rebuilt, plus the ancillary infrastructure, demand for building materials and labour will be huge. This will help China offset export slowdown. Not good for inflation control, but human crisis management comes first.
By kelaido - 5/14/2008 5:33 PM
Nature disasters typically have minor and short lived consequences on the overall economy. They loom very large in the headlines, but they actually are a small part of the economy. The only way I can see the earthquake really affecting the economy is if it shifts the political debate, but its hard to see how it would shift it in a particular direction.
Michael Pettis is a professor at Peking University's Guanghua School of Management, where he specializes in Chinese financial markets. He has also taught, from 2002 to 2004, at Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management and, from 1992 to 2001, at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Business. He is a member of the board of directors of ABC-CA Fund Management Co., a Sino-French joint venture based in Shanghai.
Pettis has worked on Wall Street in trading, capital markets, and corporate finance since 1987, when he joined the Sovereign Debt trading team at Manufacturers Hanover (now JP Morgan). Most recently, from 1996 to 2001, Pettis worked at Bear Stearns, where he was Managing Director-Principal heading the Latin American Capital Markets and the Liability Management groups. He has also worked as a partner in a merchant banking boutique that specialized in securitizing Latin American assets and at Credit Suisse First Boston, where he headed the emerging markets trading team. Besides trading and capital markets, Pettis has been involved in sovereign advisory work, including for the Mexican government on the privatization of its banking system, the Republic of Macedonia on the restructuring of its international bank debt, and the South Korean Ministry of Finance on the restructuring of the country’s commercial bank debt.
Pettis is a member of the Institute of Latin American Studies Advisory Board at Columbia University as well as the Dean’s Advisory Board at the School of Public and International Affairs. He is the author of several books, including The Volatility Machine: Emerging Economies and the Threat of Financial Collapse (Oxford University Press, 2001). He received an MBA in Finance in 1984 and an MIA in Development Economics in 1981, both from Columbia University.